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Was Harrod Right? 1
One of the frustrations of historians of economics is that economists of today often have historical ideas that reveal a failure to have read the originals or to consider their meaning. It is not so much that economists do not care about the history of their discipline; rather they are willing to take its history as having been faithfully transmitted through the textbooks. They are apt to take positions on history that are strong nearly in proportion to their being wrong. I was brought up as an economist with such a strong view of Roy Harrod's "growth" model.
In their textbook, Robert Barro and Xavier SalaiMartin (1995, p. 10) 
write that
Harrod "used production functions with little substitutability among the inputs to argue that the capitalist system is inherently unstable." Nearly every textbook that mentions Harrod in the context of growth -and many ignore him altogether -takes a similar line.
Indeed, it is the story that I have myself told (Hoover 2003, p. 413) . Harrod, it is said, offered a model of longterm economic growth that ignored substitution of factors of production and, therefore, possessed an unreasonable "knifeedge" property in which any step away from the warranted rate of growth led inexorably to collision with a full employment ceiling or to mass unemployment and depression. Robert Solow (1956) , believing that that we should not ignore substitution in the long run, changed Harrod's production function from a fixedfactors to a flexiblefactors form and showed that the price system would align the warranted rate of growth with the natural rate of growth, given by the growth of population and technology, and guarantee that deviations of the 2 warranted rate from the natural rate would be selfcorrecting. Far from being balanced on a knife edge, longterm growth was stable.
Reading Harrod's (1939) and Solow's (1956) essays side by side for a class that I taught on the history of modern macroeconomics convinced me that this potted history is a misreading, and that the misreading is one that has not grown much in the telling and the retelling, but one that, in fact, starts with Solow's essay itself. A reconsideration of Harrod shows that he was interested in very different questions than Solow and that only when one ignores that fact does it appear that he is obviously wrong. Indeed, Harrod offers a conjecture about the behavior of the economy that is not only hard to understand in Solow's framework but has also, to my knowledge, never really been given a careful empirical examination.
I. A Map of Misreading
Harrod's analysis provides the foil against which Solow displays the power of his own simple model of longrun economic growth. And by now, Solow's has become the canonical account of Harrod's model. Harrod's model pointed to pervasive instability in macroeconomic dynamics, which Solow characterized with a compelling metaphor: "the long run . . . economic system . . . balanced on a knifeedge of equilibrium growth" (1956, p. 65) . 2 Solow casts his own model as the repudiation of Harrod's knifeedge. He locates the source of the knifeedge property in Harrod's assumption that production takes place under conditions of fixed proportions of factor inputs and claims to accept 3 "all the HarrodDomar assumptions" except fixed proportions in developing his own growth model, which does not display a knifeedge (p. 66).
We can see what Solow regards as Harrod's (and Domar's) assumptions simply
by looking at what he himself assumes for his own model (Solow 1956, pp. 6668 ):
1) an economy with singlecommodity (Y); 2) a constant savings rate (s), so that savings S = sY; 3) a constantreturnstoscale production function with smooth substitution between capital and labor; 4) labor that grows at an exogenous rate (n); 5) "no scarce nonaugmentable resource like land"; 6) flexible prices and wages; 7) constant full employment of factors of production; 8) and closely related to this last assumption, the identity of ex ante and ex post investment, which guarantees the identity of ex ante investment and savings, allowing the accumulation of capital to be described by the savings function alone.
The difference between his model and Harrod's rests entirely, Solow claims, on assumption 3. Let us see how Solow exposits Harrod's model. Harrod maintains a fixed proportions production function:
(1)
, where Y = output, K = capital, L = labor, and a and b are production parameters. This function does exhibit constant returns to scale, but it does not allow substitution between capital and labor. The production function can be recast into what has been called subsequently "intensive form":
Solow had previously worked out the dynamics of growth in any system with a constantreturns production function, yielding his "fundamental equation" (p. The growth rate of the labor force may be high enough (or, equivalently, the savings rate may be low enough) that the nr ray never intersects the savings function.
The ray n 2 r illustrates such a case, and panel C shows the corresponding phase diagram.
In such cases, r collapses toward zero, no matter what positive value it takes at the start. Solow relates his model to Harrod's in the following way. First, for Harrod (1939, p. 30) , the natural rate of growth is given by the maximum rate permitted by the rates of growth of population, technology, and laborforce participation. Thus, in a model without technical progress and a constant participation rate, the natural rate of growth G N = n unambiguously, and the slope of the nr ray is, in fact, the natural rate of growth. Solow interprets Harrod's warranted rate of growth as the growth rate dictated by the production function and the savings propensity. From equation (1) In either of these extreme adjustments, the warranted and natural rates are permanently pulled apart. And any step away from their initial equality results in one of the extreme adjustments, which, according to Solow, define the knifeedge. . The capitalwidening ray n 1 r is shown cutting the savings function from below. The positive intersection at r = r* corresponds to a growth rate n 1 . The warranted rate of growth is given by the slope of a ray from the origin to the intersection of sf(r) and n 1 r. Since this ray must coincide with n 1 r, the warranted and natural rates of growth are equal. The phase diagram in panel B shows that any small deviation of r from r* will reconverge on r*; and, although the warranted and natural rates of growth may temporarily diverge, they cannot be pulled permanently apart. Any small change in n or s changes the location of r*. Again, warranted and natural rates of growth would temporarily diverge, but would reconverge on n over time. There is no excess capital at r*.
While there is no knifeedge in Figure 2 
II. Harrod Recovered
In this section, I shall establish that Solow's interpretation is a misreading. It is, however, not clear whether his interpretation itself reflects a reading of Harrod at all. For while, Solow (p. 65) refers to the "HarrodDomar model of economic growth" and, on occasion, separately to Harrod's model (e.g., pp. 66, 74), he cites neither Harrod's (1939) essay nor any other specific work of Harrod (or Domar) . This may, of course, simply reflect the citation practices of the 1950s, which are clearly different from today's. It is nonetheless not clear whether Solow was drawing on an understanding grounded in a close reading of Harrod's work or on one that drew on views of Harrod that were "in the air" at the time. Because I believe that the misreading of Harrod does not turn on subtle points, it is more likely that Solow offers a formalization based on interpretations of
Harrod that were at some distance from Harrod's text, and that it is likely that it was constructed backwards from Solow's own growth model in an effort to show which modifications captured commonly accepted views of Harrod's claims. At this point, this is simply conjecture.
Where does Solow go wrong?
In one sense, everywhere. Solow claims that his model differs from Harrod's only in not assuming a fixedproportion production function. In fact, one could make a case that Harrod does not subscribe to any of the assumptions numbered 1-8 in Section I above. Some of the differences are probably benign, reflecting the fact Solow is engaged in the construction of a tightly specified, formal model, whereas Harrod is engaged in a much less formal analysis in which he can afford to be less committed to precise 9 assumptions than Solow must be. I will, therefore, not nitpick, but concentrate on what seem like fundamental issues.
The first fundamental difference is that Harrod and Solow address different conceptual problems. Solow's article is entitled "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth," and that title accurately conveys that Solow's own model is a model of longrun economic growth. Solow selfconsciously distinguishes between Keynesian pathologies and a world of perpetual full employment:
Everything [in my model] is the neoclassical side of the coin. Most especially it is full employment economics -in the dual aspect of equilibrium condition and frictionless, competitive, causal system. All the difficulties and rigidities which go into modern Keynesian income analysis have been shunted aside. [Solow p. 91] Solow singles out r* as the "equilibrium," where r* is the point at which, after all adjustments are done, the economy achieves a steady rate of growth equal to the natural rate -a longrun equilibrium -even though at every point along the adjustment path supplies equal demands and saving and production plans are all satisfied, so that there is never any disequilibrium in a wider sense.
Harrod's article, in contrast, is entitled "An Essay in Dynamic Theory." The implicit contrast is not between shortrun and longrun or between full employment (neoclassical) and less than full employment (Keynesian) but between dynamic and static:
Static theory consists of a classification of terms with a view to systematic thinking, together with the extraction of such knowledge about the adjustments due to a change of circumstances as is yielded by the "laws of supply and demand.". . .
[Dynamic] "theory" would not profess to determine the course of events in detail, but should provide a framework of concepts relevant to the study of change analogous to that provided by static theory for the study of rest. [Harrod p. 14] Harrod defines "dynamic" broadly "as referring to propositions in which a rate of growth appears as an unknown variable" (p 17). Thus, dynamics includes more than models of economic fluctuations, such as formal multiplieraccelerator models in which dated variables and explicit lags play a crucial role. He regards such models as perhaps explaining oscillations about trends, but he also suggests that oscillations in the trend itself are a crucial part of dynamics (p. 15). In contrast to Solow's equilibrium at r*, in which growth had settled in to a steady rate, Harrod holds that
[t]he line of output traced by the warranted rate of growth is a moving equilibrium, in the sense that it represents the one level of output at which producers will feel in the upshot that they have done the right thing, and which will induce them to continue in the same line of advance. [Harrod, p. 22] The equilibrium is moving, not only in that the economy on a warranted path is growing, but also in that the parameters that govern the warranted rate itself may change frequently without any sense of convergence to a steadystate "equilibrium" of Solow's type.
Indeed, Harrod's object is not to analyze a particular path ceteris paribus for the economy, not to compare the values of variables at different periods, but to elucidate the forces that may systematically drive the economy away from its equilibrium, warranted path at any particular point of time (pp. 17, 2425) . Growth is a central concern, since growth and change are essentially synonyms, but longrun economic growth of the type that animates Solow simply does not define the agenda.
The second fundamental difference between Solow's interpretation and Harrod's essay is that Harrod makes no explicit assumptions about a production function, and his implicit assumptions do not warrant a fixedproportions, constantreturnstoscale production function, such as equations (1) or (2). In the methodological preamble to his essay, Solow writes, "The art of successful theorizing is to make the inevitable 11 simplifying assumptions in such a way that the results are not very sensitive" (p. 65). His assumption of an economy with a single good is, perhaps, one of these inevitable simplifying assumptions, but it is not one that Harrod shared:
[aggregate output is] compounded of all individual outputs. I neglect questions of weighting. Even in a condition of growth, which generally speaking is steady, it is not to be supposed that all the component individuals are expanding at the same rate. [Harrod, p. 16] Harrod saw aggregate output as a summary statistic and not as a single commodity. This might appear to be a small difference. Solow did not literally believe that the economy produced a single commodity; rather he made a strong, simplifying assumption. The importance of the difference becomes clear in Solow's derivation of the knifeedge from the sharply defined parameters of the production function. The capital output ratio (C) is a fixed parameter (a in equations (1) and (2)) for Solow. It is not fixed for Harrod:
The value of C depends on the state of technology and the nature of the goods constituting the increment of output. It may be expected to vary as income grows and in different phases of the trade cycle; it may be somewhat dependent on the rate of interest. [p. 17] C may also be expected to vary with the size of income, e.g., owing to the occurrence of surplus capital capacity from time to time . . . [p. 25] While the capitaloutput ratio is not constant for Harrod, it is importantly independent of the actual rate of growth. Its independence is related to the distinction between the actions of the individuals and their aggregate consequences, a well known Keynesian trope that frequently appears in discussions of fallacies of composition (Harrod pp. 2225) . While the aggregate balance is governed by the warranted rate of growth (and, therefore, by C and s), the actual rate of growth is governed by the reactions of many individual producers to particular conditions of over or underproduction.
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Individually rational responses to these particular conditions drive aggregate actual growth away from the warranted path. Harrod's instability is, then, pace Solow, not an unstable relationship between the warranted and natural rates of growth but an unstable relationship between the warranted and actual rates of growth.
Where Solow's own model involves an endogenous adjustment of the capital output ratio to that required by the natural rate of growth, endogenous adjustment is not critical for Harrod. It is not, however, that he denies the possibility. C is not a constant; it may respond over time to excess capacity or other factors. Still, what matters to Harrod is its value at a point of time. He is not primarily interested in the specific paths of output or in the longrun consequences of some change in parameters or policy action. Rather he wants to point out the difficulty in staying on a warranted path at any moment. Where Solow emphasizes the ultimate consequences of the knifeedge, Harrod emphasizes only how hard it is to stand on such a narrow support.
The second fundamental difference between Solow's interpretation and Harrod's essay is closely related to a third -and probably most fundamental -difference: for Solow ex ante savings and investment are always equal to ex post savings and investment. "A remarkable characteristic of the HarrodDomar model," Solow writes "is that it consistently studies longrun problems with the usual shortrun tools" (p. 66). This is not a characteristic of Harrod's analysis, remarkable or otherwise, because, as I already showed, Harrod is not concerned with longrun problems, but with the instability of the actual growth rate relative to the moving equilibrium (warranted) growth rate -a short run problem for which he believes shortrun tools are appropriate. Solow contrasts the warranted and the natural growth rates; Harrod mainly contrasts the warranted and the 13 actual rates. It is seventeen pages into a thirty page essay before Harrod so much as mentions the natural rate of growth, and, by that point, the core analysis is complete.
Harrod defines the incremental capitaloutput ratio (C) as that addition to capital goods in any period, which producers regard as ideally suited to the output which they are undertaking in that period. . . [T] he term ex ante . . . will be used in this sense. [p. 19] Harrod proceeds in the standard Keynesian manner: when ex post investment falls short of ex ante investment, output is stimulated as producers react to unexpected and undesired reductions of inventories ("stocks" for Harrod), and conversely when ex post investment exceeds ex ante investment. Harrod's principal mechanism is "a marriage of the 'acceleration principle' and the 'multiplier' theory" (p. 14). It is not, as Solow suggests, the wrong tool for the job; it is a different tool for a different job.
While Solow is aware that he has banished Keynesian problems from his own model by assuming constant full employment and the equivalence (not just the ex post equality) of savings and investment, he does not acknowledge that it is this assumption rather than the substitutability assumption that ultimately separates his model from Harrod's theory (Solow, p. 91) .
The key role of the assumption that ex ante and ex post investment are constantly equal can be clarified by reflecting on socalled optimal growth models, now a standard part of the firstyear graduate curriculum in economics (see Blanchard and Fisher 1989, ch. 2, for one of many textbook expositions). Optimal growth models are essentially Solow's neoclassical growth model in which the savings rate is no longer given parametrically, but is the endogenous outcome of an intertemporal utilitymaximization problem. The phase diagrams for such models typically involve not just capital per worker (r) but also consumption per worker. And typically, they are everywhere unstable except for a unique saddle path. The perfect foresight, or rationalexpectations, solution simply assumes that a rational agent would ignore all other paths and jump to the saddle path. The saddle path is precisely the set of points for which ex ante, planned investment and consumption decisions align with ex post, realized investment and consumption.
Growth along the saddle path is growth at the warranted rate, even though that rate (as it does on the phase diagram in Figure 2 , panel B) changes constantly until it reaches the steady state. But what happens if we do not assume perfect foresight or rational expectations? Then, the economy is, except by sheer luck, in the unstable part of the phase space. The actual growth rate differs from the warranted rate -an instability of Harrod's, not Solow's, form, despite the fact that the production function is one with smooth substitutability.
What if we maintain perfect foresight or rational expectations but replace the production function with a fixedproportions function such as equation (2)? The model still determines a phase space unstable everywhere except a saddle path, and the solution is to jump directly to the saddle path. The key assumption is not the substitutability of factors. The key assumption is the equivalence of ex ante and ex post investment.
5
The fourth fundamental difference between Solow's interpretation and Harrod's essay is that Harrod is that Solow's knifeedge and Harrod's instability along the warranted growth path are almost completely unrelated ideas. As Solow describes it:
Were the magnitudes of the key parameters -the savings ratio, the capitaloutput ratio, the rate of increase of the labor force -to slip ever so slightly from dead center, the consequence would be either growing unemployment or prolonged inflation. [p. 65]
As we already seen, a knifeedge phenomenon is not unique to the fixedproportions production function. Compare the phase diagrams (panels B and C) in Figures 1 and 2. They are topologically identical. In each case, if the nr ray rises faster at the origin than the production function (panel C), then there is a progressive collapse until growth and production disappear. In each case, if the nr ray cuts the savings function from below, there is progressive expansion until technology limits output to factor capacity and growth to the natural rate. There is one salient difference: in Figure 2 with substitutable factors, full employment is maintained along the adjustment path; while in Figure 1 , unemployment rises in panel C and capital is unemployed at the steady state in panel B.
Of course, in Figure 2 , panel C, unemployment is effectively 100 percent in the longrun state (at the origin), even if it is zero on the transition path. And if Harrod is to be believed and C adjusts to surplus capacity (p. 25), the excess capital in Figure 1, panel B, will not persist. 6 The considerations so far demonstrate that some of Solow's knifeedge properties do not depend principally on the assumption of a fixedproportions production function.
In particular, whether the economy away from the natural rate of growth grows to an upper or lower bound appears to be independent of substitutability. Rather it depends on regularity conditions in the production function -at the lower end, principally whether the slope of the production function is vertical at the origin. The existence of surplus factors of production is a difference that can be more clearly attributed to nonsubstitutability; but, as we have already seen, Harrod does not appear to subscribe to a fixedproportions production function.
More fundamentally, Solow's knifeedge is not the same as Harrod's instability of the warranted rate of growth. Solow's analysis of the knifeedge concerns the failure of the warranted rate to adjust to the natural rate, where Harrod's instability concerns the divergence of the actual rate of growth from the warranted rate. The radical difference between them is clear from the fact that they work in opposite directions.
As we showed in Section I, if an economy with a fixedproportions production function starts with equality between the warranted and natural rate and if that equality is upset, for example, by a fall in the savings rate (s), which lowers the warranted rate (s/C), then the economy as described in the phase diagram in Figure 1 , panel C, crashes towards zero output. This is one side of Solow's knifeedge.
Consider, Harrod's analysis of the same fall in the savings rate. The fall in the savings rate reduces the warranted rate of growth below the actual rate of growth. "Savers will find that they have saved more than they would have done had they foreseen their level of income . . . Consequently they will be stimulated to expand purchases, and orders for goods will consequently be increased" (Harrod, p. 21) , which widens the divergence between the actual rate of growth G and the warranted rate G W . Whereas in the case of Solow's knifeedge, a fall in the savings rate directs the economy toward lower levels of output, in the case of Harrod's instability, it directs the economy toward higher levels of output. Solow's knifeedge and Harrod's instability concern the relationship of different growth rates (G W and G N for Solow; G and G W for Harrod) and 17 for any change in parameters (s, n, C), they work in opposite directions. They address nearly orthogonal issues.
Harrod's instability can arise in Solow's own model provided that ex ante and ex post investment are allowed to diverge. Consider the phase diagram in Figure 3 , which corresponds to panel B in Figure 2 . In the usual analysis of Solowtype neoclassical growth models, the economy is restricted to paths along the capitaladjustment curve.
Consider what happens when the economy is at the steady state r* and the savings rate If we interpret, the capitaladjustment curve in Figure 3 as we did in Section I as governing the transient movements in the warranted rate of growth as it adjusts toward the natural rate, then Harrod can be said to have directly described the situation analyzed 18 using Figure 3 in terms that accurately reflect the way it is drawn. A fall in the savings rate is a Keynesian stimulus. Harrod writes:
Suppose that one of these stimulants begins to operate when the actual rate is equal to the warranted rate. By depressing the warranted rate, it drags that down below the actual rate, and so automatically brings the actual rate into the field of centrifugal forces, driving it away from the warranted ratethat is, in this case, upwards. Thus the stimulant causes the system to expand. [p. 31]
III. Harrod's Conjecture in Economic History
So far, I have argued that Solow's criticism of Harrod misfires because the key difference between them is found not in assumptions about substitutability in the production function but in the assumption that ex post and ex ante quantities are always equal. Harrod's instability is, therefore, the instability of the actual growth rate relative to the warranted rate, whereas Solow's knifeedge is the instability of the warranted rate relative to the natural rate. Yet, Harrod does consider the relationship of the warranted and natural rates; does that not lend some support to Solow's analysis? I think not.
Harrod considers the natural rate only late in the paper, after his main analytical conclusions have been established. Solow locates the knifeedge phenomenon in any case in which the warranted and natural rates fail to converge, so that the possibility that there is a persistent gap between warranted and natural rates, which Harrod seems to take as given, is exactly what Solow rejects. Yet, as we have already seen, there need be no persistent gap for Harrod's instability to arise. The message of Figure 3 is that, even if over time warranted and natural rates converge as in Solow's model, any change in parameters that temporarily drives them apart sets up Harrod's instability -with or without a fixedproportions production function.
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Still, it is worth considering Harrod's analysis of the relationship between the warranted and natural rates, since it has been neglected and it ends in a testable conjecture.
Solow is, of course, correct that Harrod does not see the convergence of the warranted and natural rates as given: "There is no inherent tendency for [the warranted
and natural] rates to coincide" [Harrod, p. 30] . Their coincidence, Solow says, would be just "an odd piece of luck" on Harrod's view (p. 77). In one sense, that is right, but
probably not for Solow's reasons. Since Solow sees the natural rate as evolving slowly and the warranted rate in his account of Harrod's model as governed by fixed parameters, only if those parameters happened to be just right could the two rates coincide. Harrod himself rejects the fixed parameter view: "Indeed, there is no unique warranted rate; the value of the warranted rate depends upon the phase of the trade cycle and the level of activity" (p. 30). Again, it is clear that Harrod's concern is not with longrun economic growth.
Unlike recent macroeconomic analyses that relate full employment or potential output to something like Milton Friedman's natural rate of unemployment and, so, allow for output to run above, as well as below, full employment or potential, Harrod's conception of full employment is the typically Keynesian notion of a ceiling. An economy is fortunate if it operates close to the ceiling, but it can never operate above it.
Harrod introduces a fourth rate of growth to his famous three: actual, warranted, and natural. The proper warranted rate of growth is "that warranted rate which would obtain in conditions of full employment" (p. 30). While the economy cannot grow faster than the natural rate allows -that is, it cannot operate above full employment, even though it 20 may grow faster than potential output when it starts below full employment -Harrod conjectures that the relationship between the proper warranted rate and the natural rate determines the likelihood of the economy operating below full employment for any length of time. He writes:
The system cannot advance more quickly than the natural rate allows. If the proper warranted rate is above this, there will be a chronic tendency to depression; the depressions drag down the warranted rate below its proper level, and so keep its average value over a term of years down to the natural rate. But this reduction of the warranted rate is only achieved by having chronic unemployment.
The warranted rate is dragged down by depression; it may be twisted upwards by an inflation of prices and profit. If the proper rate is below the natural rate, the average value of the warranted rate may be sustained above its proper level over a term of years by a succession of profit booms. Harrod's instability can manifest itself only in the downward direction as shown by the arrows.
In contrast, panel B shows a case identical up to t 0 , in which the proper warranted rate falls at t 0 (s falls or C rise). Harrod's instability can still manifest itself downward, but the region above the proper warranted growth path and below the natural growth path is now feasible, so that it may also manifest itself upwards. Instability can, in this case, drive the economy toward full employment and keep it there. Recessions are possible in both cases; but, when the proper warranted rate exceeds the natural rate, they are 21 inevitable; and, when the natural rate exceeds the proper warranted rate, full employment may prove a common outcome. Harrod's conjecture, then, is that the economy will be more stable in the sense of spending more time near full employment when the natural rate exceeds the proper warranted rate than vice versa. As far as I know, there has yet to be an explicit test of the conjecture.
I now leave the history of economics to make a brief foray into macroeconomicsor, at least, into economic history. Harrod's conjecture says that an economy in which the proper warranted rate of growth (G PW ) stands below the natural rate of growth will display "a chronic tendency to depression" and an economy in which the proper warranted rate stands below the warranted rate may be frequently driven towards full employment. There are various ways of testing this conjecture. I will examine a particularly simple one.
The proper warranted rate of growth is that warranted rate which would obtain at full employment. Harrod's notion of full employment is, as we have noted already, a ceiling. In order to construct relevant growth rates, I first construct a potential output series for the United States 19292005. (The details of the data construction are found in the appendix.) The time series is generated from a CobbDouglas production function in which the inputs are the available labor force and the capital stock and the level of total factor productivity is estimated to grow smoothly along the upper bounds of actual total factor productivity. From the time series for potential output and the capital stock, estimates of C and the net savings rate (s) can be constructed, finally yielding an estimate of the proper warranted rate for each period:
The natural rate (G N ) is just the 22 rate of growth of potential output at each period. The output gap is simply the percentage by which actual output fall short of potential output each period.
One implication of Harrod's hypothesis is that the output gap should be inversely related to the difference between the natural and the warranted rates (G N -G PW ). The downwardsloping regression line through the scatterplot presented in Figure 5 shows that this is indeed the case: when the U.S. economy has had a proper warranted rate of growth that was low relative to the natural rate, it has operated nearer to full potential. A qualitatively similar result holds even if we consider only postWorld War II data.
While this is a primitive test of Harrod's conjecture, it does, at the least, suggest that Harrod's now neglected analysis may have genuine empirical content and may be worthy of further, more careful investigation.
IV. Harrod's Fate
Solow's neoclassical growth model is a vastly important contribution to understanding the process of longrun economic growth. Solow originally cast his model as the solution to the problem of instability in Harrod's dynamic analysis. The economics profession generally accepted Solow's model, as well as his reading of Harrod, with the result that
Harrod's analysis has been consigned to the dustbin of history. Barro and SalaiMartin (1999, p. 10) , for example, write of Harrod's supposed fixedproportions growth model:
"Although these constructions triggered a good deal of research at the time, very little of their analysis plays a role in today's thinking." This is an understatement. Figure 6 shows the relative number of articles in the JSTOR archive that cite "Harrod" and "growth" relative to "Solow" and "growth," starting in 1939 Subtracting proprietors' income amounts to assuming that proprietors' income divides into labor and capital income in the exact same way as the remainder of GDP. a = the mean value of a t = 0.68.
Totalfactor productivity (A): The use of the labor force (LF) rather than employment has the effect of incorporating the "inefficiency" of unemployment into A. Since we are ultimately interested in the efficient envelope of the A t , there is not misleading. Capitaloutput Ratio (C): 
Full employment totalfactor productivity (A
